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Abstract 
 
China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR), proposed in 2013, is an ambitious initiative that 
aims at enhancing connectivity and integrating economies across countries. This thesis, by 
tracing its mechanism at three different geographical scales---global, national, and local, 
analyzes its multidimensional impact at each scale. It shows that at a global scale, OBOR is in 
the form of competing narratives over its global impact and nature; at a national scale, OBOR is 
represented as economic corridors, aiming at improving infrastructures, increasing multilateral 
trade, integrating financial systems, and strengthening cultural ties; and at a local scale, OBOR 
exerts an impact on multiple landscapes of land port, an important node of transition along 
economic corridors. 
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Introduction 
 
China’s One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR), also known as the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), has received tremendous attention from all over the world since 2013 when it 
was first proposed by the Chinese government. Consisting of the “Belt”---Silk Road Economic 
Belt---and the “Road”---21st Century Maritime Silk Road, it is a highly ambitious initiative that 
aims to improve multilateral trade among economic partners, integrate regional economics, and 
enhance regional connectivity. In the past five years, it has achieved significant progress. 
According to report from The People’s Daily (2018), more than 120 countries have signed 
collaboration agreement with China and 25 countries along OBOR have listed China as their 
largest economic partner until 2018 (see Yidaiyilu.gov 2019); in economic terms, the total trade 
between China and countries along OBOR has surpassed 5 trillion dollars and direct investment 
from China to those countries has surpassed 70 billion dollars, with an annual growth rate of 
7.2%; in cultural terms, more than 300 thousand students studying in China came from countries 
along OBOR in the past five years, and tourist spending between China and those countries is 
estimated to be 100 billion dollars. Therefore, it can be seen that this huge project which includes 
countries with a total population of more than 4 billion people on the Eurasian landmass has 
created a substantial impact. In order to examine the initiative in a thorough way, this thesis aims 
to accomplish two things. First, it seeks to understand how OBOR works, through tracing a top-
down mechanism which covers three geographical scales---global, national, and local. Second, it 
intends to uncover the impact that OBOR had at each scale. 
For OBOR, there is already an extensive literature, primarily by Chinese scholars. Topics 
examined by the literature can be roughly summarized into three main categories: OBOR’s grand 
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strategic implications, OBOR’s general economic prospects, and OBOR’s philosophical and 
theoretical foundation. For example, in the first category, Liu (2015) examined the role that 
OBOR plays within the context of global economic integration and forecasted the geostrategic 
importance of OBOR to China’s foreign policy. Yuan (2014) placed OBOR under the 
background of the strategic confrontation between China and the U.S., and argued that launching 
OBOR is critical in enhancing China’s regional power. In the second category, Zou et al. (2015) 
analyzed the economic influence of initiating OBOR on international trade between China and 
other countries; Kong and Dong (2015) examined the potential gains and challenges within the 
economic cooperation between China and countries along OBOR; and Sun, Zhang and Liu 
(2017) explored how OBOR helped China transform its export-led growth in the new era. In the 
third category, Liu, Dunford and Gao (2017) interrogated how the concept of “inclusive 
globalization” may potentially serve as the theoretical foundation of OBOR. 
However, few scholars have attempted to explore how the goals and aims of OBOR, at a 
global level, are linked to efforts from governments, companies, and individuals at national and 
local level. In other words, there is still no clear mechanism that links OBOR, as an international 
initiative, to national, and then local, actions. Thus, the first contribution of this thesis to today’s 
academic conversation about OBOR is to trace the mechanism of this huge initiative from a 
global-level narrative to specific projects at national and local level, and to examine the impact 
of OBOR at each scale. Specifically, at a global scale, I will critically analyze the aims and goals 
of OBOR in an international context; at a national scale, I will explore the functions of economic 
corridors---the skeletons of OBOR---in achieving the goals of this ambitious initiative; and at a 
local scale, I will focus on one specific type of places---land ports, which lie on national borders-
--and the role that they play in the context of OBOR. 
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Moreover, compared with previous literatures, this work contributes in two additional 
ways. First, previous articles that examined OBOR at a global scale, especially those written by 
Chinese experts, paid little attention to the opinions toward OBOR held by other major 
economies. Therefore, to better understand how OBOR is viewed differently by various parts of 
the world, I incorporate the U.S. and the EU’s opinions of this initiative into this thesis at the 
global scale, which can help avoid depending too much on either Chinese or western own 
rhetoric. 
Second, in addition to the perception discrepancy between China and the West regarding 
the defining nature of OBOR, another void in the literature that needs to be filled is the study of 
land ports at a local scale. Researches and reports on OBOR thus far tended to be so much 
obsessed with the role of sea ports, that land ports studies are significantly limited. Land port, or 
border port, is a place situated on national border where people and goods can lawfully enter a 
country. Despite a rising attention given to the transformation of political and economic 
prospects of inland provinces including Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolian Autonomous 
Region in China’s borderlands, existing literature of Chinese land ports focuses narrowly on their 
spatial distribution (Wang, Cheng and Mo 2014), and their economic role in cross-national trade 
(Yang, Jiang and Wang 2017). Most literature ignores many landscapes other than economics at 
land ports and the multidimensional role that they play to support OBOR. Thus, in this thesis, I 
examine the pluralistic landscapes of land ports in the context of OBOR by focusing on two pairs 
of land ports in the form of case studies. 
The rest of this thesis is structured into three chapters. The first chapter, at a global level, 
introduces OBOR by bringing in various opinions of this initiative from three different 
economies---China, the U.S. and the EU, and interrogates the logic behind their rhetorics. The 
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second chapter, delving into the transition between the macro image and the micro scenario, 
explores at a national level both the theory and reality of economic corridors, the skeletons of 
OBOR. The third chapter, at a local level, focuses on two pairs of land ports along economic 
corridors--Alataw Pass and Khorgos in Xinjiang province, and Erenhot and Manzhouli in the 
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, under the context of OBOR, and within each individual 
case study included the analysis of the political, economic and cultural transformation of land 
port. Throughout the process of tracing the mechanism “global---national---local” to understand 
how OBOR works, I examine the impact of this initiative at these three different geographical 
scales, and argue that at each scale, OBOR has created a substantial impact accompanied by 
contentions and controversies. 
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Chapter 1: Global Scale 
What is OBOR? 
In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan and lectured at 
Nazarbayev University. In his speech, the term “Silk Road Economic Belt” made its first 
appearance. A month later, in October, Xi visited Indonesia, during which he declared “21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road”. Since then, the “Belt” and the “Road” joined together as OBOR. 
 
 
Diagram 1: One Belt One Road Initiative 
(Source: McKinsey Company 2016) 
 
In 2015, Chinese National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce jointly published “Vision and Action on Jointly Building 
Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-century Maritime Silk Road”, a document that serves as both 
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an introduction and an overarching guide of OBOR in principle. I will use this document to 
briefly describe the attributes and functions of OBOR. 
At the very beginning of this announcement, it directly refers to the history of the ancient 
Silk Road, in order to establish a connection and point out the similarity between the old and new 
versions of Silk Road, and, additionally, show the continuity of the mission of Silk Road 
throughout history---“peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and 
mutual benefit” (National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China 2015, 1). This mission is also 
regarded by the Chinese government as the main theme of international relations in the 21st 
century. Following the reference to the historical context, this document puts OBOR under the 
global context in which there is a changing economic order---the continuation of the negative 
shocks of the 2008 financial crisis, the changes in investment and trade patterns, and so on. 
In order to “uphold the global free trade regime and the open world economy in the spirit 
of open regional cooperation” (p2), OBOR is designed to link East Asia and Europe 
economically, encompassing many relatively less-developed countries with economic potentials 
in the hinterland of Eurasia. Routes that connect China and other regions are called “economic 
corridors”. According to Asian Development Bank, an economic corridor is a network of 
infrastructures encompassing a certain geographical region, aiming to stimulate economic 
growth (Brunner 2013). 
For specific projects along economic corridors, they can be roughly divided into four 
main types, as listed in “Cooperation Priorities” section. They are: connectivity facilitation, 
unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bond (p5-p10). In other words, 
OBOR aims to enhance connectivity by improving transportation infrastructures such as 
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pipelines, highways and railroads, increase bilateral and multilateral trade by expanding trade 
areas and removing trade barriers, build a stable currency, investment, and financing system in 
Asia by extending the scale of bilateral currency swap and settlement with countries along 
OBOR, and finally, advocate cultural exchanges and promote a harmonious civil environment by 
encouraging academic exchanges and tourism. 
Thus, according to “Vision and Action”, the principle guide of OBOR, China seeks to, 
through infrastructure construction, international trade, financial integration and cultural ties, 
strengthen its relationships with countries along six different economic corridors which jointly 
form the initiative. In the next section I will list and compare competing narratives on OBOR 
from China, the U.S. and the EU, in order to better understand how China, as the founder and the 
leader of OBOR, the U.S., which is circumvented by OBOR, and the EU, which serves as the 
other pole of OBOR, view this ambitious initiative respectively. 
 
Competing Narratives 
OBOR is a massive project, and people’s opinions and values towards OBOR heavily 
influence the shaping of it. To better understand how OBOR is socially and conceptually shaped 
by different actors, and the effect of the construction of OBOR beyond China, I bring in three 
different narratives on this project, from China, the U.S., and the EU, respectively. 
 
------China’s narrative 
I divide China’s official and elite narrative on OBOR roughly into three parts: 1) 
emphasizing its economic attribute; 2) claiming the difference between OBOR and traditional 
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geopolitical competition and 3) linking it to a higher-level objective---build “a community of 
shared future for mankind”. 
First of all, Chinese government has, for multiple times, emphasized the fundamental 
attribute of OBOR---an economic initiative rather than a political strategy. For example, in 
“Vision and Action”, OBOR is placed under a changing economic order, and this announcement 
avoids mentioning both the political motivations and implications of OBOR. Moreover, 
emphasizing the importance of economics to OBOR from a historical perspective is exactly the 
strategy pursued by the documentary “Belt and Road” which is produced by China Central 
Television (CCTV). Similar to “Vision and Action”, in episode one of this documentary, the old 
Silk Road was referred to again in the beginning, implying that the purposes of both the old Silk 
Road and today’s OBOR are the same: benefit people through trade, which is in economic, 
instead of political, terms. 
 
 
Diagram 2: The Ancient Silk Road 
(Source: CCTV 2017) 
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Second, in May 2017, at the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, Chinese 
President Xi explicitly stated that OBOR will not repeat the old pattern of geopolitical 
competition (Zhang 2018). Furthermore, both Chinese government and academic scholars argued 
that, OBOR is actually a win-win project that will mutually benefit China and other partners who 
participated in it. For instance, in August 2018, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during his 
visit to Mongol, said that OBOR is the international public product that China provided, and it 
has nothing to do with the so-called Chinese version of “Marshall Plan” (Liu 2018). More 
generally, OBOR is often called as an “initiative”, rather than a “strategy” within Chinese 
rhetoric, and scholars such as Huang Fengzhi and Ge Hanwen (2018) further claimed that the 
practice of OBOR is not the geostrategy of China. 
Third, continuing the rhetoric that OBOR is not political-oriented, in August 2018, 
Chinese President Xi, at the 5th Anniversary Symposium on Promoting the Construction of 
OBOR, employed a new term to describe the ultimate goal of OBOR---build “a community of 
shared future for mankind”, which corresponds to the “tian xia” value of Chinese people---
harmony between all nations (Han 2018). It should be noted that this term was first proposed in 
2012, but it was not until the launching of OBOR that this term had been widely employed in 
related literatures (Chang and Zhao 2012). In fact, the idea of “a community of shared future for 
mankind”, or sometimes referred to as “a community of shared interests and destinies”, points 
out a situation in which all countries’ interests and destinies, in the era of globalization, are tied 
together, and all human beings’ futures are related to each other (Qu 2013). OBOR, according to 
the official Chinese government rhetoric, will just lead to such kind of global harmony through 
different types of international collaborations in terms of both economics and culture. 
Comprising every single individual and country on this planet, it is a highly grand rhetoric. The 
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reason why China’s narrative on OBOR focused heavily on these three points will be analyzed in 
the next section. Meanwhile, two other major economies, the U.S. and the EU, have different 
standpoints. 
 
------the U.S. narrative 
Generally speaking, according to the analysis of major reports and researches on OBOR 
conducted by ASAN Forum, Atlantic Council, and Center for a New American Security, I find 
the core tone of the US response to OBOR to be “ambivalence with more negativity”, for the 
reason that OBOR is a significant challenge to the U.S. while it also presents itself as an 
opportunity to some extent.  
On the one hand, the U.S. is not covered by OBOR geographically, which implies that 
the world’s largest economy is isolated from this grand economic initiative. Therefore, one of the 
primary rhetorics shared by related reports conducted by American scholars concerned with the 
possibility of a new economic order emerging on Eurasia, which is led by China, instead of the 
U.S. This potential new order may be created through both the infrastructure construction led by 
China and other Asian countries’ greater economic dependence on China (Meltzer 2017).  
Moreover, it is interesting to point out that in contrast to the Chinese rhetoric in which 
OBOR is clearly differentiated from a geopolitical initiative, the U.S. narrative, including 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, report from the Atlantic Council, 
research from Center for a New American Security, and review on “US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission Hearing on OBOR” all explicitly regarded geopolitics as an 
important motivation for China launching this initiative: 
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“China’s infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations...” (The White House 
2017, 46) 
 
“China is betting on an old geopolitical proposition...The United States should stay away from, and even oppose, 
initiatives that are geopolitical in nature, or are used as a smokescreen to mask China’s geopolitical ascendance” 
(Luft 2017, 1-4) 
 
“Geopolitical motivations also underpin the Belt and Road – and they have become more pronounced since its 
inception...” (Kliman and Grace 2018, 5) 
 
“Foreign observers have speculated about Beijing’s ulterior geopolitical motives. Commentators liken the BRI to the 
Marshall Plan...” (Wuthnow 2018, 2) 
 
On the other hand, nevertheless, OBOR is also viewed positively to some extent. The 
best example is the presence of American delegation at the Belt and Road Forum for 
International Cooperation in 2017 (Blanchard and Wen 2017). Matthew Pottinger, the head of 
the American delegation, pointed out that “American companies have much to offer the OBOR” 
(Hsu 2017). For instance, both countries could enhance their level of cooperation in fields such 
as infrastructure development, a favorite theme within the Trump administration and an area that 
China is experienced at. 
 
------the EU’s narrative 
I choose the term “conditional acceptance” to describe the overall tone from the EU 
towards OBOR. In general, the EU welcomes OBOR for its role in increasing the connectivity of 
both Europe and Asia, while still remains skeptical over whether it can follow strict industry 
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rules. For example, Jyrki Katainen, vice president of the European Commission, represented the 
EU and claimed at the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation that the concept of 
improving connectivity lies at the center of China-EU collaboration, and more investment in 
cross-border links along OBOR could unleash huge growth potential with benefits both for 
China and the EU, but OBOR should “adhere to a number of principles”, including transparency, 
sustainability, and interoperability (Katainen 2017). 
However, it is worth noting that across different countries in Europe, opinions towards 
OBOR vary significantly. Geographically speaking, Western European countries tend to be more 
conservative in applauding OBOR; by contrast, more than a dozen countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe, including Poland, Hungary, and Romania, have expressed much enthusiasm and 
signed memorandums with China (Corre 2018). For example, French President Macron, during 
his visits to Beijing, said that China should be aware of protecting intellectual property and 
public market access, and avoid dictating OBOR on its own (Fouquet and Shi 2018). Meanwhile, 
the 16+1 forum created in 2012 by 16 Central and Eastern European countries and China has 
become a solid platform for OBOR, and the Budapest–Belgrade railway, one of the leading 
projects of OBOR in Eastern Europe that is currently under construction, is warmly welcomed, 
as the Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto put: “We, in this region, have looked at 
China’s leading role in the new world order as an opportunity rather than a threat” (Peto 2017). 
 
Behind the Narrative 
Rhetorics can be ideological, biased, and sometimes misleading. Therefore, compared to 
the rhetoric itself, the logic that supports and the incentives that build the rhetoric are more 
important. Thus, this section looks at the reasoning behind three different narratives. 
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First, emphasizing the economic attribute of OBOR does reveal the fact that primary 
motivations of China implementing this project are economic. I divide the pressures that cause 
the emergence of economic incentives to build OBOR into two categories: pressure from 
without, which deals primarily with the Malacca Dilemma, and from within---overcapacity and 
overcapitalization. 
Abroad, China increasingly concerned with the “Malacca dilemma”, the term used to 
describe the situation that around 80% of China’s Middle Eastern energy imports pass through 
the Strait of Malacca, while this passage is vulnerable to blockade (Winn 2014). Considering that 
U.S. security architecture rests heavily on island chains which control the Pacific Ocean, China 
has to explore other new supply passages, especially on-land routes which end up extending deep 
into Eurasia, in order to secure and diversify the supply of necessary resources and energies. 
Domestically, in recent years China has faced the problem of overcapacity, which has 
appeared in lots of sectors, such as steel, coal, aluminum, cement, electric power machinery, and 
ferrous and non-ferrous metal mining (Hu et al. 2010; Yuan et al. 2016). For instance, China is 
the biggest steel producing country in the world, but annually almost a billion tons of Chinese 
steel cannot find an outlet for sale (World Steel Association 2017). Thus in order to increase the 
demand for Chinese capital and goods, Beijing intends to look for export markets, especially in 
less developed countries. Moreover, one of China’s long-term monetary policy goal---
internationalization of RMB, the official currency of China, also gives impetus to the 
construction of B&R economic blueprint (Liu et al. 2017). When more and more RMB are 
settled in cross-border trade, it can decrease the trade risk and reduce dependence on US dollars. 
Accordingly, the emphasis on the economic motivations in Chinese narrative reflects the 
need for China’s government to make changes to meet economic challenges. 
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Second, the reason why official Chinese narrative avoids binding OBOR with politics 
derives from the need to differentiate OBOR from traditional geopolitical competition and the 
determination to transcend classic geopolitics which was once used as a guide for empires to 
achieve hegemonic goals. To be specific, the rise of China has been a heated topic for a decade 
and there have been endless debates around whether the rise of China will threaten peace in East 
Asia. To avoid the situation in which the launching of OBOR under the background of the rise of 
China is exploited to strengthen the western argument that China will follow the old geopolitical 
pattern and threaten regional peace, Chinese government keeps emphasizing that OBOR is not a 
geostrategic initiative that may cause regional conflicts. 
Third, to further strengthen the second statement, China’s government suggests building 
“a community of shared future for mankind” as a solution to move beyond the geopolitical 
dilemma. By linking together different countries’ interests and destinies, it evokes a sense of 
harmony and helps set up a friendly image of the Chinese government to the whole world. 
Besides, this can also be viewed as a sort of value export for Chinese culture. 
Therefore, I argue that the Chinese narrative on OBOR derives from the need to 1) justify 
that the motivations of launching OBOR are primarily economic; 2) counter the argument that 
OBOR is a form of traditional geopolitical competition and 3) establish a positive and friendly 
image and export the value of “the community of shared interests and destinies” in the long term. 
The American narrative is actually determined by the current U.S.-China relationship. 
Attributing the motivation of launching OBOR to geopolitics reflects two things.  
First, describing China as a “revisionist country” in the National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America (The White House 2017, 25), the U.S. is worrying about a potential 
power balance shift between the U.S. and China in Asia due to the launch of OBOR. In other 
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words, the mainstream American rhetoric believes that China will, by OBOR, enhance its 
regional influence, become the future leader of Asia, and change the geopolitical order.  
Second, the result of the potential “changing geopolitical order” is dangerous to the U.S., 
after careful geopolitical calculations. As Wuthnow points out---“OBOR is a modern 
manifestation of early 20th century British geographer Halford Mackinder’s thesis that 
dominating Eurasia is a prerequisite for global hegemony” (Wuthnow 2018, 2), classical 
geopolitical concepts are employed here to help calculate the geopolitical implications of OBOR. 
According to the Heartland theory, the domination of the Heartland of Eurasia---a large portion 
of landmass in the Eurasian hinterland---by a single land power forebodes the unification of the 
World Island---Asia, Europe and Africa together (Mackinder 1919), which is the situation that 
the U.S. has been constantly tried to avoid since the 20th century. OBOR, by its massive 
infrastructure developments, especially high-speed railways that are designed to cross through 
the entirety of Eurasia, can help China expand its on-land strategic depth and counterbalance the 
advantages that the U.S. possesses in the Pacific. Therefore, I argue that the competing rhetorics 
on whether OBOR is geopolitical-oriented reveals an emerging power’s meticulousness in 
positioning itself and justifying its action, and a present global power’s concern over power 
shifts. 
However, arguments that view OBOR positively reflect the fact that today’s close 
economic interdependence between the U.S. and China hardly allows a complete deterioration of 
the bilateral relationship. For instance, infrastructure development is regarded as a platform for 
collaboration between the U.S. and China because it can serve a similar role as “climate change” 
did during the Obama administration (Luft 2017, 14). In April 2018, at the 9th China-U.S. 
Transportation Forum, Yang Chuantang, the Secretary of Party Committee at the Ministry of 
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Transport, claimed that “China is willing to work with the U.S. side, under the framework of 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the U.S. plan for rebuilding infrastructure and 
transportation development” (Wong 2018). 
For the EU, its exclusive focus on “connectivity” derives primarily from the “Council 
Conclusions on EU Strategy on China” which argues that the EU-China relationship should be 
oriented primarily towards improving “infrastructure, trading, digital, and people-to-people 
connectivity” (Council of the European Union 2016, 5). Furthermore, facing the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis and the refugee crisis, enhancing the connectivity facilitates the inflow of 
foreign investment and more trade opportunities (Suetyi 2017). However, similar to the concerns 
that the U.S. has, whether OBOR can obey the high industry standards in Europe and whether it 
can be constructed in pure economic terms without geostrategic consideration is the factor that 
caused the EU’s hesitation to fully embrace this ambitious project. 
As for the difference in attitudes across countries in the Europe, it can be best explained 
by the varied economic situations in different countries. On the one hand, many Central and 
Eastern European countries need Chinese infrastructure expertise and capital to develop local 
infrastructure systems that are not well-organized. On the other hand, Western European 
countries such as the United Kingdom and France, though also desiring foreign investment from 
outside Europe, are concerned with the potential negative shocks to domestic economies brought 
by OBOR, including increasing competition from Chinese construction firms, such as high-speed 
railway construction companies, and job market impacts. 
In conclusion, China intends to, by pushing forward OBOR, improve its relationships 
with neighboring countries through better infrastructure connectivity, convenient cross-national 
trade, integrated financial system and closer cultural ties, which apparently forebode a global 
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impact. Meanwhile, contentions arise in the form of competing narratives. For example, the U.S. 
and the EU have expressed their different opinions on OBOR at a global scale. But putting aside 
the rhetoric which reveals concerns over the global impact that OBOR will impose, it is 
necessary to delve into the mechanism that links the grand rhetoric of OBOR to specific projects 
proposed in the blueprint, in order to understand how OBOR works at other scales. In the next 
chapter, I will zoom in the picture and examine how economic corridors, the main skeleton of 
OBOR, are designed to pursue the strategic goals of this initiative by analyzing their theoretical 
basis and construction reality at a national level. 
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Chapter 2: National Scale 
Economic Corridor: Theory 
OBOR, according to the analysis in the first chapter, aims at enhancing connectivity, 
increasing trade, integrating financial systems, and improving cultural communication. However, 
to achieve all four goals listed above, a connection must be made between China and countries 
that participate in OBOR. Specifically, enhancing connectivity requires infrastructure 
construction; increasing trade depends on transportation of goods; financial integration requires 
institutions; and cultural exchange requires movements of people and ideas. All four purposes 
require a spatial connection in physical world that links China and other countries. In this light, a 
passage, in a geographical sense, has to be constructed, and that is called an economic corridor.  
As introduced briefly in the first chapter, an economic corridor is a geographically-
targeted development passage. In fact, the idea of “corridor” can date back to at least 1949, when 
Thomas Taylor (1949, 278-300) mentioned “corridor” in a geographical context. In 1969, 
Charles Whebell (1969, 1-26) described “corridor” as a linear system which connects different 
geographical areas through transportation infrastructure. In 1996, ten “Pan-European transport 
corridors” were proposed at the second Pan-European Transport Conference (Reynaud 2003). As 
its name shows, these corridors are primarily transportation-oriented and include the construction 
of roads, rails and canals. Similarly, in the context of OBOR, the proposal of economic corridors 
is also based on the theory from economic geography, claiming that corridors, with international 
transportation as foundation, can adjust industry structure by the agglomeration of labor forces 
and improve regional economic integration by resource development (Zhang and Shi 2017). It is 
often viewed as an economic axis that can be extended to cities nearby and thus transformed into 
an economic zone with a larger geographical coverage.  
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Comparing the functions of an economic corridor described in theories, which are 
primarily in terms of economics, and the four main purposes of OBOR that economic corridors 
are designed to achieve, it is interesting to find that the responsibilities of an economic corridor 
in the context of OBOR are multi-dimensional, since it addresses not only economic 
development, but other aspects of international cooperation as well. In this light, I argue that an 
economic corridor within OBOR differs from a traditional transportation-based passage which 
aims only at economic growth; rather, it is a route that encompasses various kinds of landscapes 
of a certain region and aims at multi-dimensional collaboration between countries, including 
economic development, institutional improvement, and social and cultural communication, as 
evidenced in the next section by efforts to promote both economic growth and social harmony 
between China and countries along OBOR. In sum, from a theoretical perspective, an economic 
corridor in the context of OBOR is a transportation-infrastructure-based geographical passage 
that links together many countries, with the aim of promoting bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation in terms of economic growth, institutional development, and cultural 
communication. 
China intends to construct six economic corridors that connect China with six different 
geographical areas: 1) China-Mongolia-Russia corridor 2) New Eurasian Land Bridge 3) China-
Central Asia-West Asia corridor 4) China-Pakistan corridor 5) Bangladesh-China- India-
Myanmar corridor and 6) China-Indochina Peninsula corridor. Thus, through the construction of 
these six corridors, OBOR is transformed from a concept into six passages that can be identified 
on a map (see Diagram 3). The next section details the six corridors. 
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Diagram 3: Six Economic Corridors 
(Source: Ng 2017) 
Note: the New Eurasian Land Bridge’s official destination is Rotterdam, Netherlands. It appears to reach Spain 
visually on the map because there is a rail line from Netherlands to Spain. 
 
 
 
Economic Corridor: Reality 
After briefly examining the theories that support the concept of economic corridor, it is 
necessary to understand whether in reality the theories are useful. The first half of this section 
looks at the six corridors separately by focusing upon specific projects, such as energy plants, 
dams, railroads, cultural communication institutes, etc., that have been or are being constructed 
along them, and argues that in the context of OBOR, different corridors target at different means 
of achieving economic growth. However, instead of simply presenting a list of projects, in the 
second half of this section I will explore the complex reality about how the projects that we see 
today were socially negotiated, contested, and shaped within the Chinese bureaucratic political 
21 
 
 
system which involves a variety of players. In this regard, the second part of this section pays 
special attention to the role that Chinese domestic politics plays in the negotiation and shaping 
during the construction of economic corridors, and claims that the reality behind the construction 
of economic corridors is more complicated than the theory which describes the functions of 
them. 
 
------China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor 
This corridor consists of two passages, one of which starts from Beijing, connecting cities 
including Hohhot, capital of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous region, Ulan Bator, capital of 
Mongolia, Krasnoyarsk, the third largest city in Siberia, and ends at Moscow, and the other one 
follows the old Chinese Far East Railway, passes through Shenyang, Changchun, and Harbin, 
and arrives at Chita.  
 
 
Diagram 4: China-Mongolia-Russia corridor 
(Source: Caralb News 2017) 
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According to the official document “Outline of the Plan of Constructing China-
Mongolia-Russia economic corridor”, primary platforms for the trilateral cooperation are 
infrastructure development and trade (National Development and Reform Commission 2016, 2-
5). First, in the “Analysis Report of China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor”, OBOR is 
designed to connect with both Russia’s “Greater Eurasian Partnership” and Mongolia’s “Steppe 
Road Initiative”, which are all based on economic cooperation aiming at enhancing the 
connectivity through infrastructure development (Center for Development in The Inner 
Mongolian Autonomous Region 2017). Known projects on this corridor include Arxan-
Choibalsan railway, Moscow-Kazan high speed railway, and China-Russian natural gas eastern 
pipeline (Railway Technology 2018). Second, bilateral trade has increased significantly. In 2018, 
China-Russia bilateral trade volume peaked over 100 billion dollars for the first time, based on a 
27.1% increase year on year (Ministry of Commerce of the PRC 2019); in January 2019, volume 
of trade between China and Russia reached 9.2 billion dollars. 
However, disagreement over the future of this economic corridor arose when the China-
Russia bilateral relationship was taken into consideration. According to some Chinese 
nationalists, though Russia is now ranked as a “comprehensive strategic partner” in Chinese 
diplomacy, as a strong land-power in the hinterland of Eurasia, Russia still desires to keep its 
sphere of influence, especially in Central Asia, which is also an important region that OBOR will 
cross (Tremin 2012). Therefore, a potential clash of interests in Central Asia between China and 
Russia will make the future of China-Mongolia-Russia corridor uncertain. 
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------New Eurasian Land Bridge 
Also known as the Second Eurasian Continental Bridge, it is the international railway line 
that starts from Lianyungang, a sea port on the Pacific coast, to Rotterdam in the Netherlands, 
with a total mileage of 10900 kilometers. 
 
 
 Diagram 5: New Eurasian Land Bridge 
(Source: Meiya Pico 2016) 
 
One of the rail services on this international railway---China-Europe Railway Express, is 
a landmark project of OBOR, and it is designed specifically at enhancing trade volume through 
the increase in “connectivity” as proposed by the Chinese government. In reality, the 
contribution of this land bridge to international trade is significant in recent years: between 2011 
and 2018, total value of goods transported per year increased from 600 million dollars to 16 
billion dollars, and the number of train operations per year increased from 17 in 2011 to 6300 in 
2017 (Sohu 2018). More importantly, the number of train operations from Europe back to China 
also increased to a great extent. In 2018, there were 2090 train services from Europe to China, 
which more than doubled in 2017, and the categories of goods transported became diversified: 
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from electronics such as laptops and mobile phones, to including machines parts, agricultural 
products, clothing, etc. (CINIC 2019). 
The significant workload of this railway reminds readers of Halford Mackinder’s famous 
article “The Geographical Pivot of History”, in which Mackinder claimed that “trans-continental 
railways are now transmuting the conditions of land-power, and nowhere can they have such 
effect as in the closed heart-land of Euro-Asia…” (Mackinder 1904, 434) The reason why his 
emphasis on transportation in the hinterland of Eurasia proposed more than a hundred years ago 
can still illuminate OBOR in the 21st century is that Mackinder viewed the importance of 
mobility in the currents of history: “Is not the pivot region of the world’s politics that…is today 
about to be covered with a network of railways?” (p434) It is the “persistent geographical 
relationship” that he pointed out extends the temporality of improving connectivity in Eurasia as 
a geopolitical event. In other words, the construction and improvement of the New Eurasian 
Land Bridge will greatly promote the mobility of land powers and the connectivity between 
them, which potentially lays down the foundation of a new Eurasian order. Therefore, improving 
China-Europe Railway Express is not only an economic issue, but carries geopolitical 
implications as well.  
However, an important question can be raised immediately: Is the New Eurasian Land 
bridge efficient enough to compete with maritime transportation in order to become the 
transportation basis of a new Eurasian economic order? It is usually a conventional wisdom that 
costs of maritime transportation are generally much lower than rail transportation, and this gap 
will grow larger when the amount of goods is greater (Rodrigue et al. 2017). But for OBOR 
which spans across the largest piece of land on earth---Eurasia, land transportation can also gain 
relative advantage over sea transportation. According to Lu et al. (2018), after taking into 
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account of both the transportation costs and time costs, the pattern of competition in 
transportation efficiency between rail and maritime transportations reaches a 1:1 dynamic 
equilibrium state on the Eurasian landmass. In other words, as shown in Diagram 6, a division 
line of costs between land and maritime transportation exists, stretching from Berlin, crossing the 
Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, Iran, Afghanistan, Tibetan Plateau, and Inner Mongolia of China, to 
Chumikan in the Khabarovsk Krai of Russia. To the North of this line, rail transportation to 
Beijing and Berlin, the two main cities situated on the two poles of OBOR, costs less money than 
maritime transportation. In fact, a large portion of the New Eurasian Land Bridge and the China-
Mongolia-Russia corridor just lies within the area north of this line, which shows that land 
transportation does have potentials to serve as the basis of the economic integration in the 
Eurasian hinterland. 
 
 
 
Diagram 6: Balance lines of container transport in Europe-Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative 
(source: Lu et al. 2018) 
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Yet it is apparent that this land bridge will encounter problems, and an obvious one is its 
complexity. Spanning over nearly half of the earth, this land bridge covers more than 30 
countries, with at least 14 kinds of languages and 4 main types of religions. But in Central Asia, 
countries including Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with complicated ethnic composition, poor 
education levels, stagnated economic development, have tended to become breeding ground for 
terrorism, which makes the land bridge construction vulnerable and fragile. This is also one of 
the primary weaknesses of the next corridor: China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor. 
 
------China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor 
Starting from Xinjiang province, this corridor stretches all the way up to Persian Gulf and 
Mediterranean, with passing countries include five Central Asian countries, Iran and Turkey. 
 
Diagram 7: China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor 
(source: OBOReurope) 
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Energy cooperation is a big part of the construction of this corridor. Known projects 
include Central Asia-China natural gas pipelines (Line A, B, C, and D) which link China with 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Dushanbe No. 2 thermal power plant and Nurek hydropower station 
in Tajikistan, Angren thermal power plant and Karakol gas field in Uzbekistan, etc. (AFP 2016) 
The primary mechanism to achieve the so-called “win-win” cooperation works in such a 
way that energy infrastructure construction in Central Asia raises local tax revenues and creates 
jobs, while importing gas from Central Asia alleviates the pressure from the increasing Chinese 
demand of natural gas. In reality, more than twenty thousands more jobs have been created in 
Uzbekistan due to the construction of infrastructure projects along this economic corridor (Jiang 
2019). On the other hand, the Central Asia-China natural gas pipeline, a 1830 kilometers-long 
passage underneath the Central Asian soil, has enabled 47 billion scf of natural gas to flow into 
China every year, which provides about 15 percent of the total annual demand of natural gas in 
China (Qi 2017). 
Cultural communication plays an important role in the construction of this corridor. In 
fact, understanding between China and Central and West Asian countries in terms of cultures is 
particularly important, because throughout Chinese history, Central Asia and the Middle East 
were always places known for mystery, and before modern times only through vast deserts or 
high mountains could they be reached geographically. Today in the era of OBOR, in order to 
increase the degree of Chinese cultural exposure to Central Asian countries, Confucius Institutes 
funded by the Chinese government have been established along the corridor at Tashkent, 
Samarkand and other cities (Jiang 2019); activities such as International Forum of Central Asia 
Cultural Exchange and Cooperation and Silk Road International Film Festival have also been 
organized along with infrastructure constructions in this region (Zeng 2019). Thus, cooperation 
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in terms of both economics and culture between China and its western neighbors intensified 
since the launch of OBOR, but the utility of these activities is still undecided. 
 
------China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
Generally, China-Pakistan relationship is special. According to the classifications of 
“partners” in Chinese diplomacy, Pakistan is the only country listed as the “all-weather strategic 
partner”, which means no matter how international or domestic situations change, China-
Pakistan friendship will persist (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2015). In 2015, Wang 
Yi, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a vivid analogy in his conversation with Pakistan 
Prime Minister Aziz during his visit to Islamabad: “if One Belt One Road is a symphony, then 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is its first chapter” (Associated Press of Pakistan 2017). 
There is no doubt that this economic corridor receives priority. Specifically, it starts from 
Kashgar in Xinjiang Province, extending through the entirety of Pakistan, and ends up at Gwadar 
Port. 
 
Diagram 8: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(source: OBOReurope) 
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Different from other corridors which emphasize on one or two aspects of bilateral 
cooperation such as trade or energy development, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is designed 
to achieve all four purposes of OBOR---better infrastructures, increased trade, improved 
financial systems, and more cultural exchange. 
In terms of infrastructure construction, notable projects include upgrading Pakistan’s 
railroads, new highway construction, and metro development in Lahore, the second-most 
populous city in Pakistan (Malik 2017). Moreover, since 2013, a series of energy facilities 
including hydropower, solar power, wind power, and nuclear energy power generations have 
been built in Suki Kinari, Sahiwal, etc., as shown in Diagram 9. Besides the remarkable 
improvement on electricity supply, it also helps stabilize domestic textile industry from moving 
to India (Syed 2018). 
 
 
Diagram 9: Major Projects of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(source: Markey and West 2016) 
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The star project of this economic corridor is the Gwadar Port, which started functioning 
in 2016. To China, the investment in the construction of Gwadar Port accelerated the 
establishment of a deep-sea port that can be connected directly to China-Pakistan economic 
corridor, and this route can be used to import oil: from the Persian Gulf to Gwadar Port, and then 
through China-Pakistan railway to Xinjiang province. However, the success of this project didn’t 
prevent the rise of local opposition. The Baloch people in the province of Balochistan where 
Gwadar Port is situated opposed this project through strikes and conflicts during its construction 
period, because they perceive the territory of Balochistan as their own home, which should be 
prevented from foreign intervention, either physical or economic (Lim 2017). Perhaps the 
opposition can be best demonstrated by the attack on the Chinese consulate in November 2018, 
initiated by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a militant organization in Balochistan 
advocating Baloch separatism (Notezai 2018).  
This concern relates to the issue of China’s cultural influence on Pakistan. Though by 
building Confucius Institutes and attracting Pakistani students to visit China, Beijing indeed 
strengthened its cultural image in Pakistani society, yet whether the local population of Pakistan 
will accept the presence of Chinese power within their own territory is important in determining 
the future of this corridor. 
 
------Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor 
As its names shows, this corridor connects China and India together, with Bangladesh 
and Myanmar in between, geographically. 
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Diagram 10: Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor 
(source: OBOReurope) 
  
This corridor places its main emphasis on trade, institutional cooperation, and policy 
coordination. For example, Agreement on Facilitation of Cross-border Goods Transportation 
through Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, Accord on Joint-transportation 
between China and Myanmar over Ayeyarwady River, and Agreement on Jointly Constructing 
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor have been reached by the four countries 
in the years following the announcement of OBOR (Yao and He 2018). 
However, the biggest challenge to the construction of this corridor is India’s reluctance. 
As another big land power that is rising gradually, India has always been aiming at enhancing its 
own influence in the Indian Ocean (Pant 2018). However, OBOR extends into this region. In 
reality, right after China proposed OBOR, New Delhi initiated the “Monsoon Plan”, aiming to 
construct an India-centered order in Indian Ocean area which include East Africa, Arabian 
Peninsula, Indian subcontinent and South-East Asia (Pioneer 2017). Due to resemblance, the 
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Monsoon Plan is often referred to as the “Indian version of One Belt One Road” (Zhu 2017). 
There are two opposite interpretations of Monsoon Plan: 1) it will link China’s B&R to construct 
a mutually beneficial mechanism and achieve win-win situation or 2) it will counter China’ B&R 
to achieve India’s regional influence. If Modi’s government chooses the second option, both 
political and economic bilateral relationships between China and India will deteriorate, which 
inevitably increases the difficulty of the completion of Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
economic corridor. 
 
------China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor  
It starts from Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan, and ends at Singapore, passing 
through a series of Southeast Asian countries including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. 
 
Diagram 11: China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor 
(source: OBOReurope) 
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Similar to Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor, this corridor looks for deeper 
economic integration through not so much infrastructure development as multilateral agreements 
and policy coordination between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as a whole. As five out of the ten members of ASEAN, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 
Thailand and Malaysia play an important role in South-East affairs, especially regional economic 
integration. This corridor provides an opportunity to bond these countries more firmly with 
China economically, increases China’s influence on ASEAN and thus advances its regional 
influence in South-East Asia. 
To sum up, six economic corridors within OBOR are all transportation-infrastructure-
based passages that aim to promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation in terms of economic 
growth, institutional development, and cultural communication. Moreover, different corridors 
may have different emphasis with respect to specific types of cooperation. For example, the New 
Eurasian Land Bridge is designed almost exclusively for enhancing Eurasian trade, while 
corridors that extend into Central Asia and Middle East often relate to energy cooperation in a 
variety of ways. To be more specific, the construction of economic corridors in the context of 
OBOR indeed enhanced the volume of trade between China and its neighbors. Meanwhile, 
Beijing also paid close attention to the role that cultural communication plays in multi-
dimensional cooperation between countries, but the effectiveness of strengthening cultural bonds 
is still undecided. This can be demonstrated by the contestations between the presence of 
Chinese power in foreign countries and the complicated local socioeconomic environments. 
It should also be noted that the shaping of those projects behind their physical 
construction is not straightforward. Behind corridor construction are contention and controversy, 
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which deserve greater analysis. So in the next part of this section, I analyze the process of how 
domestic Chinese politics comes into play behind those projects by laying out three major points. 
First, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that the process of the making of policies 
and initiatives such as OBOR is dictated by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
alone, there are in fact a variety of players competing within the Chinese political system to 
express their voices regarding OBOR and the construction of economic corridors. For example, 
the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Transport, with varied interest-orientations, could 
have different opinions with regard to specific infrastructure projects (Yu 2018, 9). Facing the 
railroad construction in Central Asian countries, the Ministry of Commerce focused exclusively 
on returns and risks of this project as an investment, while the Ministry of Transport paid more 
attention to the efficiency and practicality of infrastructure construction (Ministry of Commerce 
of the PRC 2018; Ministry of Transport of the PRC 2016). Besides competition at a ministerial 
level, provincial governments also compete with each other for projects that can benefit local 
economies to be approved by the Central Committee in the blueprint of economic corridors (Yu 
2018, 8). Since Beijing has decided to devote a large sum of capital into OBOR, provincial 
governments has always been attempting to earn the attention of Beijing in order to attract more 
investment. For example, Yunnan province and Guangxi province competed with each other in 
order to serve as China’s gateway to Southeast Asia since the launch of OBOR, because for the 
province that is granted the name “gateway”, it will increase its popularity and attract both 
domestic and foreign investments (He 2018, 8). 
Second, in addition to bureaucratic players within the Chinese government that 
participate in the competition for interests of OBOR, academia is also involved in the 
construction of economic corridors. Specifically, Beijing has offered significant research grants 
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for Chinese scholars in domestic universities to take over specific instructions from the Party to 
carry out studies on how to improve multilateral cooperation along economic corridors, 
including, for instance, how to enhance China’s soft power in neighboring countries (Lanzhou 
University News 2019). Putting aside the effectiveness of scholars’ research outcomes, it at least 
revealed the efforts of Beijing to actively bring academic scholars into the shaping of this huge 
initiative. For example, Tsinghua University, a major in China, established an OBOR research 
institute under the instruction of the Central government, which regularly published reports on 
OBOR, including “Constructing an Upgraded One Belt One Road: From Top Design to 
International Consensus” before the start of the Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation in May 2017 (Qu 2017); Beijing University, another top university in China, has 
been assigned at least two major OBOR tasks: 1) research on historical and cultural development 
in countries along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and 2) research on archeological 
discovery along Silk Road and heritage of Silk Road civilization (Zou 2019); and China 
University of Petroleum in Beijing, as a higher education institution which focuses on petroleum 
development, has received suggestions from the government to collaborate with state-owned oil 
corporations to perform joint research on the prospects of oil industry along economic corridors 
(Zhang 2018). 
This process is broadly defined by Bruce Dickson as “co-optation”, which refers to 
organizing and recruiting elites including intellectuals into the practices of social policy-making, 
one of the main “survival strategies” of the Chinese Communist Party (Dickson 2016, 14). In this 
light, besides the potential outcome of OBOR---sustainable economic growth---that can serve as 
the opportunity for CCP to further consolidate its legitimacy of power, the process of attracting 
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more scholars to participate in the shaping of OBOR and construction of economic corridors also 
provides a venue for CCP to gain popularity and strengthen its seat in power. 
Third, OBOR is a highly opaque initiative, despite that the Chinese government has 
published official documents such as “Vision and Action” and “Action Plan (2018---2020)” 
which have outlined the direction of OBOR vaguely. In fact, such opaqueness is a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, it provides enough room for Chinese domestic political players to act 
flexibly without many constraints from rules; on the other hand, it further enhances the level of 
distrust from other countries because such opaqueness hardly convinces partners, especially the 
EU, that their investment in infrastructure are guaranteed by an underwriter (Yu 2018). 
Considering that opinions from outside China also influence the shaping of OBOR, as argued in 
the first chapter, whether clear guidelines on investment and financial activities within the 
boundary of OBOR can be drafted is important to the financing of this huge initiative. 
In conclusion, it is obvious that six economic corridors, as the skeletons of OBOR, have 
exerted a substantial impact on both China and other participating countries in both economic 
and cultural terms. But there are contentions, as evidenced in some Chinese nationalists’ 
concerns over the China-Mongolia-Russia corridor in relation to the influence of Russia, and the 
local Baloch resistance to the construction of Gwadar Port in Pakistan. Furthermore, impact and 
contentions of OBOR are also implied within the Chinese domestic political system regarding 
the negotiation process of the construction of economic corridors. Competing voices across 
provincial governments and ministries are observed and non-political players, such as academics, 
also participate in this ambitious initiative. After an overview of both the theory and reality of 
economic corridors, the third chapter of this thesis focuses on a pivotal node along the corridor, 
the land port, in order to understand how OBOR is reflected in local development. 
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Chapter 3: Local Scale 
Land Port: Theory 
Economic corridors which link countries together are tended to be divided arbitrarily into 
two sections: domestic (Chinese) part and foreign part. This dichotomy ignores the pivot that 
connects these two parts together---port of entry (POE). Generally, a POE is a place where 
people and goods can lawfully enter a country, and there are three main categories of them: sea 
port, airport, and land port. Since all six economic corridors of OBOR are on-land passages, their 
domestic and foreign parts are linked by one certain type of ports---land ports. Land ports, by 
narrow definition, include road port and rail port that situate on national borders. Broadly 
speaking, nevertheless, land ports also include river port, since some national borders either cross 
river at a particular place, or are rivers themselves. 
According to “Vision and Action” (p6-7), land ports along economic corridors are 
supposed to take four major responsibilities, and they are: “improve the customs clearance 
facilities”, “establish a single-window in border ports”, “set up coordination mechanisms”, and 
“strengthen relationships with sea ports”. I categorize the first two responsibilities into 
infrastructure support and the last two into institutional support.  
In fact, theoretical motivations for constructing land ports along economic corridors in 
terms of economics are twofold: enhance the mobility of movements of economic factors 
including labor, capital, technology, information, etc. through infrastructure, and establish well-
developed institutions, including policy coordination and communication of thoughts, to weaken 
the barrier function of border. To be more specific, two economic theories support the 
infrastructure and institutional development at land ports: growth pole theory and border 
advantage theory. 
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The growth pole theory, first proposed by the French economist Francois Perroux, argues 
that the economic core within a region is called a “growth pole”, which is usually a place with 
strong locational advantage (Parr 1999). By developing economic activities in the growth pole 
through absorbing and aggregating various production factors and economic agents, the growth 
pole also drives economic growth in nearby regions through a spillover effect. Land port, as a 
place which people and goods pass through, is believed to have the economic potentials to serve 
as a growth pole that can drive the economic growth in borderlands. Therefore, land ports are 
designed theoretically to become economic cores, spreading economic activities outward. 
Besides the growth pole theory, border advantage theory is also an important theoretical 
tool that supports the development of land ports. It bases its argument on three aspects: 1) the 
duality of a border, 2) geographical gradients at a border, and 3) cross-border needs from inland 
countries (Hu 1993). First, the duality of border refers to the roles that both culture and economy 
play in border areas. During peacetime, culture exchange and economic development, instead of 
military conflicts, are the main feature in borderlands, which lay down a favorable environment 
for regional prosperity at land ports. Second, the geographical gradient at border refers to the 
difference between two countries that share the border in terms of socioeconomic characteristics 
(Zhang and Shi 2017). It is the difference that motivates both parties to participate in trade and 
exchange, which may benefit both. Third, finding an on-land passage that extends to the sea is 
necessary for landlocked countries to develop international trade. China, with both long borders 
shared with landlocked countries and a long coastline, is important in relation to the economies 
of neighboring countries, such as Mongolia and Kazakhstan. With the need to cross borders to 
expand trade from inland countries, land ports serve as connecting points to the sea. 
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In the next section, I will explore how the present development of land ports is influenced 
by OBOR and to what extent they follow the theoretical trajectories, by focusing on the reality at 
several specific land ports in the form of case studies. 
 
Land Port: Reality 
Out of more than 300 land ports spread along China’s 22800-kilometers-long borders, 
there are several major land ports due to their geographical locations with respect to OBOR---
they situate precisely on the passage of economic corridors as shown in Diagram 12: Manzhouli 
and Erenhot are pivots of China-Mongolia-Russia corridor; Alataw Pass and Khorgos are pivots 
of both New Eurasian Land Bridge and China-Central Asia-West Asia corridor; Khunjerab Pass 
is the pivot of China-Pakistan corridor; Ruili is the pivot of Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
corridor; and Mohan, Hekou and Pingxiang are pivots of China-Indochina Peninsula corridor. 
 
 
Diagram 12: Major Land Ports under the Context of OBOR 
(source: map created by the author) 
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Rather than surveying all major OBOR land ports, the study focuses on two pairs of land 
ports---Alataw Pass and Khorgos in Xinjiang province, and Manzhouli and Erenhot in Inner 
Mongolian Autonomous Region. The reason of choosing these two pairs of land ports as the 
subjects for case studies stems from two main facts. First, all four of them can be categorized as 
the largest land ports at a national level in China. Second, OBOR is generally a westward-
oriented initiative that intends to link China with countries on its western side, and these four 
land ports are all westward-facing gateways of China, which play an important role in the 
context of OBOR. 
The focus of the following case studies is to analyze the relationship between OBOR and 
specific land ports in both directions. In this part I will examine how the advent of OBOR 
impacts the multiple landscapes of land ports, and simultaneously, the effect of the development 
and transformation of those land ports on facilitating the progress of OBOR at a local scale. 
Since existing literatures of land ports development focus primarily on their economic prospects 
while ignoring other aspects, to establish a comprehensive framework used for analyzing the 
influence of OBOR on land ports, I borrow an important concept from Arjun Appadurai: the 
concept of five “-scapes”. Appadurai (1991) argued that the post-Cold War world witnessed the 
tensions between cultural homogenization and heterogenization, and thus the global order is 
featured by disjunctures between economy, culture, and politics. To articulate the disjunctures, 
he used five “-scapes” to describe them: ethnoscapes---human flow, mediascapes---cultural flow, 
technoscapes---technology flow, finanscapes---finance flow, and ideoscapes---ideology flow. In 
order for this paradigm to fit better into the context of OBOR, in this thesis I use technoscape to 
describe the development of infrastructure projects based on technology, ethnoscape to examine 
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the population influx, ideoscape and mediascape to analyze the cultural and ideological flow, and 
finanscape to explain the economic and financial influence.  
 
---Alataw Pass and Khorgos 
 
Alataw Pass 
Alataw Pass (Chinese: 阿拉山口; pinyin: Alashankou), also known as Dzungarian Gate, 
is the second largest land port in Xinjiang province, equipped with railway, road, and pipeline 
passages. About 330 kilometers away from “the Eurasian Pole of Inaccessibility” (46° 17′ N, 86° 
40′ E)---the most distant point from an ocean on the Earth, Alataw Pass is situated deep in the 
Eurasian hinterland, and it is noted for its severe geographical environment---intense sunlight, 
extremely little rainfall, and most importantly, fierce wind. As one of the four major “wind 
drought places” in China, Alataw Pass endures strong wind which blows at about 40 mph in 
more than 160 days every year (Xie 2016). 
 
Diagram 13: Alataw Pass 
(source: map created by the author) 
42 
 
 
However, despite its severe geographical environment, Alataw Pass has been utilized as a 
convenient gateway between China and the Eurasian steppe for a long time, at least since the 17th 
century when the Manchu people governed China (Fan and Tian 2006). In 1883, when the Qing 
Dynasty signed the unequal treaty with the Russian Empire, Alataw Pass became the official 
border. In the next century since then, unfortunately, the function of Alataw Pass as a node 
connecting China and Central Asia weakened significantly, due to the poor relationship between 
Qing and the Russian Empire at the turn of the 20th century, and later the Sino-Soviet Split in the 
1960s (Jiang 1990). It was not until 1990 that the State Council of PRC approved the 
construction of Alataw Pass as a land port. In the 29-years history of the reopening of Alataw 
Pass, China’s Western Development Strategy initiated in 2000 once served as an important 
impetus for its growth, and now, OBOR is another. 
First of all, the first label that OBOR brought to Alataw Pass was “transportation node”, 
for the most obvious transformation of Alataw Pass’s physical landscape since the launching of 
OBOR is lines of railway tracks and containers on them, crossing the border between China and 
Kazakhstan. As a crucial node of transportation on the New Eurasian Land Bridge, more than 
70% of all China-Europe railway express services have to cross this land port (Sohu 2018). In 
this light, OBOR directly influenced the finanscape of Alataw Pass by reshaping its economy to 
a “corridor-based” type. In other words, drastically increasing flows of goods through rail 
transportation enhanced Alataw Pass’s role as a corridor, or a passage, that connects one place 
with another. However, as OBOR was shaping the finanscape of Alataw Pass, whether such kind 
of corridor-based economy is the ideal type for the future development at Alataw Pass is 
controversial. In fact, contentions arose when scholars argue that in order to substantially 
increase the economic welfare of local communities, a passage-based economy is not enough, for 
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the simple reason that the values of goods on trains moving across the border cannot stay at 
Alataw Pass (Yao et al. 2012). To further improve the economic performance of Alataw Pass, it 
is necessary for the passage-based economy to move to a growth-pole based economy. In 2014, 
Alataw Pass government established a comprehensive bonded area which connects lines of 
railway tracks in order to attract more investments, which is a crucial component of the new 
finanscape of Alataw Pass. 
A comprehensive bonded zone (CBZ), also called a comprehensive free trade zone, is a 
“special commercial area with favorable taxation policies, managed by customs officials” (Shira 
2019). In general, a CBZ combines the functions of a tax-protected area, an export processing 
zone, and a bonded logistics zone, focusing on transportation, distribution, storage, handling, and 
intermediate trade (Wang 2016). The Alataw Pass CBZ, as the first of its kind in Xinjiang 
province, has experienced the trade volume equivalent to 8 billion dollars until 2018, and 
attracted more than 460 companies, including Huamao Corporation from Anhui, Aikang from 
Jiangsu, Zhende Medical Textile Corporation from Zhejiang, and Sarbulak Corporation from 
Kazakhstan (Li 2017). Through favorable taxation policies, the CBZ aims to further attract 
investments and drive the agglomeration of nonferrous metals, minerals, farm products, etc. in 
order to accelerate the transformation from passage-based economy to a growth pole. 
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Diagram 14: Alataw Pass CBZ 
(source: Sohu 2018) 
 
As more and more companies moved into Alataw Pass City, the change in finanscape 
incurred a transformation of local ethnoscape as well, for an increasing number of people moved 
here for businesses. It should be noted that the creation of CBZ attracted people into not only 
CBZ itself, but Alataw Pass City in general as well. According to an interview conducted by the 
Xinhuanet (Li and Li 2016), Luo Zhong, coming from the city of Bole, is the owner of the 
biggest supermarket in Alataw Pass City, and in two years, the size of his supermarket doubled 
to 400 m2; Zhao Liansheng, who came from Changji, found a job driving diesel locomotives at 
the rail station three years ago, and most drivers and workers at the railway station actually come 
from other places; Sister Ji, who came to Alataw Pass with a million yuan, invested in a game 
center, which is now the only one in the city…… It is after the gradual change in the finanscape 
of Alataw Pass that people with very different backgrounds came here looking for opportunities, 
and thus their ways of living changed significantly. 
However, the influence on the ideoscape and mediascape at Alataw Pass from OBOR 
remained limited to the ideological inflow from Beijing, the center of OBOR. To be specific, 
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rather than Kazakhstan, the primary source of ideas inflow at Alataw Pass is the Chinese central 
government, which influences the way that local government designs Alataw Pass, in order to 
better serve the purpose of OBOR. One of the good examples is the diversity of municipal 
activities organized by the government of Alataw Pass that aimed to advocate to the mass public 
the “Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” delivered by the 
Chinese president Xi at the 19th Communist Party of China National Congress in 2017 (Ifeng 
News 2017). Through organizing events such as panel discussions and entertainment evening 
parties, the ideoscape and mediascape at Alataw Pass gradually turned to look at the closer 
relationship between Alataw Pass and Beijing, by trying to bring the “thoughts” from Beijing 
into the locality. Moreover, the term “Spirit of Alataw Pass” was soon created after the 19th CCP 
National Congress. Similar to the “thoughts” advocated by the central government, the “Spirit of 
Alataw Pass” refers to “taking roots, dedication, and devotion to duty” (Zhang and Shi 2017). By 
coining this term and collecting slogans with which can deliver this spirit among mass public, 
Alataw Pass government transformed local ideoscape with an increasing presence of ideology 
from Beijing. 
On the other hand, however, cultural communication between Kazakhstan and China at 
Alataw Pass remained limited, and one of the reasons may be the low degree of openness of the 
land port on the Kazakhstan side which connects directly with Alataw Pass---Dostyk. As the land 
port on the Kazakhstan border that is only 12 kilometers north of Alataw Pass, Dostyk is still not 
fully open to the Chinese market, and thus cultural inflow from Kazakhstan into China is very 
limited (Xinhuanet 2014). 
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Thus, launching OBOR affected multiple landscapes of Alataw Pass, especially its 
finanscape and ethnoscape. Meanwhile, the transformation of Alataw Pass in recent years also 
facilitated the progress of OBOR. 
First, China-Europe railway express, as one of the most important projects of OBOR, 
crosses the border between China and Kazakhstan at Alataw Pass. Though Alataw Pass had 
served as a transportation node at the Chinese border since 1992, it was not until the 
establishment of Alataw Pass city in 2012 and the launch of OBOR that this land port accelerated 
the construction of rail-transportation-based infrastructures. Without extensive infrastructure 
investment at Alataw Pass in recent years, the China-Europe railway express would have 
stagnated in terms of both the frequency of train operations and volumes of goods transported. 
As a crucial transition node on the New Eurasian Land Bridge, Alataw Pass, until August 2018, 
has witnessed more than 6000 train operations of the China-Europe railway express (CINIC 
2019). Without Alataw Pass, entire services of China-Europe railway express would have to 
depend only on Khorgos, another land port that connects China and Europe through railway, 
which would decrease the efficiency and raise costs. 
 
Diagram 15: China-Europe Railway Express crossing the border at Alataw Pass 
(source: Yidaiyilu.gov 2018) 
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Second, at Alataw Pass, infrastructure construction of pipelines contributed to the 
operation of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, which is the first energy import pipeline listed at 
a strategic level to China (Sun 2017). Though not visible to the public, this pipeline along the 
Silk Road is indispensable to the material landscape of OBOR. As the destination on the Chinese 
side, Alataw Pass plays an important role in handling the oil running through the pipeline: after 
the commercial trade handover at customs, Alataw Pass oil station pressurizes petroleum into 
pipelines which cross inland to China, passing through Urumqi, the provincial capital of 
Xinjiang province, and Lanzhou, the provincial capital of Gansu province, and ending at Sichuan 
province (China Machinery Industry Federation 2017). Until 2017, the overall amount of oil 
transported from Kazakhstan to China through this pipeline had reached 100 million tons, which 
greatly alleviate the pressure from the increasing domestic demand of oil for industrial purposes 
in China (Qin 2017). 
Third, as mentioned above, the CBZ represents the institutional experiment at China’s 
borderland in support of OBOR. In addition to stimulating local economy, it is also designed to 
improve the customs clearance facilities. For instance, by combining custom declaration form 
and inspection declaration form into one single form, CBZ increases declaration efficiency. 
(Xinjiang News 2018). However, the institutional improvement of Alataw Pass custom is still 
incomplete. A notable example is the impeded construction of electronic custom/port. An 
electronic port is a database including all sorts of data related to a specific physical land port, 
directly connected to the national telecom public network based on internet technology for 
supervision and regulation (Zhu 2014). But due to lack of funding, especially from the central 
government, progress of constructing electronic land port at Alataw Pass is slow (Guo 2014). 
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Khorgos 
200 kilometers away from Alataw Pass, Khorgos (Chinese: 霍尔果斯; pinyin: 
huoerguosi) is the oldest and the largest land port in Xinjiang province. Lying within the Ili river 
valley, Khorgos, with Karasu River and Khorgos River crossing through, enjoys a better 
geographical environment than Alataw Pass. The exclusive locational and environmental 
advantage of Khorgos in Central Asia thus undoubtedly turns it into an instrumental gateway 
between China and the West. The meaning of the word “Khorgos”, in the Mongolian language, 
is “the place which caravans pass by” (People’s Daily 2014). 
 
Diagram 16: Khorgos 
(source: map created by the author) 
 
Having a much longer history as a land port than Alataw Pass, Khorgos had started its 
role of a transportation node along the ancient Silk Road in the Tang dynasty. Nevertheless, 
Khorgos shared with Alataw Pass a very similar development trajectory in modern history: it 
became the official border area during Qing dynasty, and due to the deteriorated relationship 
between the PRC and the Soviet Union, Khorgos was closed from 1962 until 1983. After the 
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reopening of Khorgos, trade between China and the Soviet Union (later Kazakhstan) increased 
gradually, and in 2010, Khorgos economic development zone was created (Zhang 2018).  
Different from Alataw Pass, Khorgos’s finanscape is shaped through OBOR by another 
experiment: China-Kazakhstan Khorgos International Frontier Cooperation Center (KIFCC). As 
the first cross-border economic and investment cooperation center in the world, KIFCC is a 
model center under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Wang 2012). The primary functions 
of KIFCC include transportation, storage, hosting trade talks, commodities presentation, 
financial services, etc. Specifically, goods entering KIFCC will not be levied custom taxes and 
import value-added taxes; citizens from both countries can enter the center making businesses 
without applying for a visa, and each person from the market is allowed to bring goods in the 
value equivalent to 8000 yuan without taxes into China per day. Until 2017, investment into 
infrastructure construction at KIFCC had reached 1.5 billion yuan, and more than 4000 
merchants have settled in (Ma 2018). 
 
Diagram 17: Sketch Map of KIFCC 
(source: photo taken by the author) 
50 
 
 
With the expansion of KIFCC, the urbanization in Khorgos also reached a new stage. 
From an economic perspective, the percentage share of the service industry in Khorgos has 
reached 80% in 2016, and from a demographic perspective, urban population reached 80 
thousand, with an urbanization rate over 70% (Li and Yimamu 2016). Though the expansion of 
the ethnoscape of Khorgos in recent years showed similarity with Alataw Pass---attracting 
businessmen by providing commercial opportunities and chances for profits, the growth of both 
the ideoscape and mediascape at Khorgos followed a different pattern. Most importantly, cultural 
communication between Kazakhstan and China at Khorgos is much more intense than at Alataw 
Pass, one of the reasons being the Ili river valley, as one of the few fertile places for people 
living in this region, provides an ideal environment for the Chinese culture, represented mainly 
by the Han people’s customs, to encounter the Kazakh and Uyghur cultures. Rather than natural 
resources, the multidimensional ideoscape and mediascape at the Ili river valley is the product of 
interaction between people and their different styles of life, featuring a sense of mystery and 
curiosity. Under the context of OBOR, the primary means through which the ideoscape and 
mediascape at Khorgos are shaped is tourism.  
With the advent of OBOR, Khorgos, which was previously rather strange to most 
Chinese in the inland provinces, soon became a popular name that is famous for its role in 
transportation and trade along the New Eurasian Land Bridge. The growing fame of Khorgos can 
be best demonstrated by the increase in the number of visitors. From 2011 to 2018, the number 
of tourists to Khorgos increased by 397% and revenue from tourism increased by 580% 
(Xjhegs.gov 2018). Therefore, with a larger number of Chinese tourists on the supply side, the 
demand side---Kazakh, Uyghur, and Mongolian cultural elements---naturally entered the market 
at Khorgos. In 2013, the first “border tourism” project was initiated in KIFCC (Li 2018), and 
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Chinese visitors came here for purchasing local artifacts and souvenirs, or enjoying songs and 
dances played by ethnic minority performers. By exposing traditional forms of entertainment of 
ethnic minorities to Chinese visitors, the ideoscape and mediascape at Khorgos feature an 
increasing mix between various cultures. Meanwhile, the transformation of ideoscape at Khorgos 
echoes in a larger geographical area: the “border tourism” also stimulated the cultural cohesion 
in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, which Khorgos belongs to. For instance, local residents 
host visitors from inland provinces of China at their own houses, treating them to luxury feasts 
during the Nadam Fair, an important Mongolian festival (Zhang and Shi 2017).  
In addition to the four “-scapes” mentioned above, the technoscape of Khorgos is also 
transformed by OBOR, primarily through the construction of the Central Asia-China natural gas 
pipelines. In fact, these natural gas pipelines are huge infrastructure projects based on 
knowledge, expertise, and technology, and one of the most exciting features related to the 
technoscape of this particular infrastructure is the materiality of the pipeline itself. I will show 
how the technoscape represented by the Chinese-led infrastructure construction based on mature 
Chinese technology is processed, by introducing two technological debates over the materiality 
of pipelines.  
The first debate is around using either straight steel pipe, with an easier production 
engineering and a higher production efficiency, or spiral steel pipe, with a higher intensity and 
better durability, as the basic material. According to the rules followed by Central Asian 
countries, especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, they choose straight steel pipe as the main 
material for gas pipelines, while China, famous for its mature industry in the mass production of 
spiral steel pipe, prefer the latter (Xu and Wen 2015). This contentious debate lasted for months, 
eventually ending with the acceptance by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan of using spiral steel pipe 
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after being convinced by both Chinese and Russian experts (Wang et al. 2014). As the ultimate 
selection of choosing spiral steel pipe promoted the progress of the Chinese domestic steel 
industry and stimulated Chinese technology to extend to border area and even abroad, this 
decision also enabled the underground technoscape of Khorgos to connect smoothly with not 
only Chinese domestic pipelines, but Central Asian pipelines as well.   
The second debate centered on the dimension of the pipeline. Originally planning to use a 
single pipeline with 1422 millimeters in diameter, the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) found the supply of such pipelines too limited for this project that was facing a hard 
deadline (Li et al. 2015). Thus, the CNPC, the primary company in charge of the pipeline 
construction, proposed the usage of double pipes, each of which has a diameter of 1067 
millimeters (Arranz and Hernandez 2016). After a series of negotiations over the new experiment 
between China, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, this proposal was accepted by all parties, and 
now it has become the safeguard for successful handover of natural gas at Khorgos. Therefore, 
Khorgos, as the destination of the Central Asia-China natural gas pipelines, witnessed the 
emergence of Chinese infrastructure technology in pipeline construction, which contributed 
greatly to the improvement of the technoscape in Chinese borderlands. 
Similar to Alataw Pass, Khorgos has experienced a significant transformation due to 
OBOR, but development and experiment at Khorgos in recent years also created an impact on 
the execution of OBOR at the local scale. 
First, in addition to the strategic importance of processing thousands of China-Europe 
railway expresses and importing oil from Central Asia through pipelines as indicated in the 
previous section, an important reason that contributes to the particularity of Khorgos in OBOR is 
its duality in role---it is both the destination and the transition node. On the one hand, 
53 
 
 
“destination”, referring to the destination of Central Asia-China pipeline, is represented by the 
national border marker that erected over ground on the border line, delivering a sense of national 
sovereignty. On the other hand, the “transition”, referring to the transitional role that Khorgos 
plays between this international pipeline and China’s domestic pipeline which extends all the 
way up to its eastern coast, is represented as the exchange of reports between Chinese and 
Kazakhstani experts at the natural gas metering station in Khorgos at the end of every month. 
The space of Khorgos is thus featured as the co-existence of both national sovereignty and global 
governance. In other words, Khorgos is of great importance to OBOR in two ways: first, it 
manifests the sacred sovereignty and the increasing Chinese power with respect to expertise and 
technology that is being instilled at borderlands, and second, it exemplifies the enhancing 
connectivity proposed by the Chinese government regarding OBOR. 
 
Diagram 18: National Boundary Marker at Khorgos 
(source: photo taken by the author) 
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Second, besides railway and pipeline infrastructure construction, Khorgos also devoted 
its resources to providing institutional support for OBOR by trying to improve customs 
efficiency. In 2017, the online monitoring platform of distribution and concentrated 
transportation was established in KIFC, in order to increase the efficiency of customs declaration 
and clearance by combining declaration, distribution, and transportation of goods into a single 
internet system (China News 2017). 
 
---Manzhouli and Erenhot 
 
Manzhouli 
Manzhouli (Chinese: 满洲里; pinyin: manzhouli), lying within the northwestern part of 
the Hulun Buir Grassland, is the largest land port in China. Due to its special geographical 
location---in the triangle of “China-Mongolia-Russia borders”, it is also called the “window of 
East Asia” (HKTDC Research 2019).  
 
Diagram 19: Manzhouli 
(source: map created by the author) 
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In contrast to Alataw Pass and Khorgos which have served as transportation nodes for 
hundreds of years, it only took Manzhouli a century to transform from an area with pure 
grasslands to the largest land port in contemporary China. It was in 1901 when the Russian 
Empire initiated the operation of the old Chinese Far East Railway that Manzhouli, as a stop 
along this railway, started its development (Du 2018). In the decade after the foundation of PRC, 
Manzhouli ranked at the No.1 land port in China in terms of freight traffic, partly due to the 
outbreak of the Korean War which pushed China to import large quantities of Soviet military 
materials, commodities, and industrial facilities (Wang 2003). Not surprisingly, the Sino-Soviet 
split in the 1960s hampered the development of Manzhouli as a land port, but after 1980s, as the 
relationship between Beijing and Moscow recovered gradually, Manzhouli again turned into the 
biggest land port in China. 
The new finanscape at Manzhouli under the context of OBOR looks like the compound 
of the ones at both Alataw Pass and Khorgos: besides international railways that start from 
Suzhou in Jiangsu province, crossing Manzhouli, and end at Europe, the finanscape comprises at 
least three main economic experiments---a comprehensive bonded zone, a border economic 
cooperation zone, and an international logistics park. Similar to the international frontier 
cooperation center at Khorgos, the border economic cooperation zone is an economic area that 
aims at enhancing border trade and improving processing materials for export. The Manzhouli 
border economic cooperation zone specializes in two types of exports: wood processing and 
vegetable processing (Sun el al. 2017). Yearly volume of vegetables exported to Russia after 
processing at Manzhouli has reached 400 thousand tons (CNR News 2017). On the other hand, 
the international logistics park is a center of distribution of cargo and logistics information, 
focusing on international delivery (Jiang and Wang 2008). Located within the “pivot” of the 
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China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor, all three economic zones have not only attracted 
huge investments, but fundamentally reshaped the finanscape of Manzhouli by making it an 
economic model for all other land ports in China. 
As for ideoscape and mediascape at Manzhouli, they are highly pluralistic because there 
is a strong mix of nomadic culture, grassland culture and “red” culture (culture of Chinese 
resistance against foreign invaders in the past century). Though the presence of these three 
different types of cultures can date back to the 20th century, it was not until the launch of OBOR 
that the cultural mix came into public attention. This is because the Manzhouli government took 
the opportunity of OBOR to expand the influence of Manzhouli as a land port, by promoting 
attractive ideoscape and mediascape. In the 2018 official document “Report on the Work of 
Government”, Bu Xiaolin, the president of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, claimed 
that the driving force of culture is crucial to the development of Manzhouli (Bu 2018). It should 
be noted that the importance of culture was seldom mentioned in official government documents 
in previous years. 
Tourism also plays a crucial role at Manzhouli because tourists stimulated the mingling 
of various cultures. Grassland culture is best portrayed here by ancient tombs of Xianbei 
nationality, the traditional nomadic people in Mongolia since the Han dynasty, sites of ancient 
Liao city, Genghis Khan’s ancient barracks, etc. (He 2018) On the other hand, the “red” culture 
is recollected by huge funds that local government invested in renewing historical sites such as 
Communism Memorial Plaza, Soviet Red Army Martyr Memorial Park, underground 
intelligence station used by Chinese militias during the War of Resistance against Japan, and so 
on (Pan 2017). As tourists move between sites, various sorts of cultural representations became 
linked together, forming a pluralistic ideoscape at Manzhouli. 
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As the largest land port in China, Manzhouli undoubtedly contributed to enhancing 
connectivity between China, Russia, and Mongolia. In terms of infrastructure construction, 
Manzhouli government initiated the upgrade and expansion project of international roads and 
railways in 2016 in order to further enhance the capacity of goods transportation (Guo 2017). By 
the end of this project, volume of goods transported through roads has reached 10 million tons 
(Jia 2017). Institutional improvement at Manzhouli custom is exemplary. Domestically, the 
Manzhouli custom has established the “single window” system, which greatly simplifies the 
process of custom clearance. For example, “single window” at Manzhouli custom decreases the 
number of using traditional physical pass cards which have to be stamped and signed by multiple 
departments of the custom (Li 2017). Under the “single window”, manual processings are 
replaced by internet system, which saves time for drivers crossing the border and thus increases 
the clearance efficiency. Internationally, in June 2018, Manzhouli custom joined the system of 
“International Road Transport” (TIR), which allows customs in countries other than departure 
country and destination country to skip the process of goods inspection (Xinhuanet 2018). 
 
Erenhot 
Erenhot, lying midway between Beijing and Ulan Bator, is China’s largest land port that opens 
directly into Mongolia. In history, Erenhot was first known in 1899 as a stop along the telegraph 
line set up between Zhangjiakou and Ulan Bator. In 1956, Erenhot City was established, as the 
Beijing-Ulan Bator-Moscow international railway went into operation (Qin 2018). 
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Diagram 20: Erenhot 
(source: map created by the author) 
 
The China-Mongolia cross-border economic cooperation zone started from 2017 is the 
backbone of Erenhot’s new finanscape. As another cross-border economic zone following the 
international frontier cooperation center at Khorgos, it has a similar growth pattern with KIFCC: 
electronic businesses, logistics, storage and intermediate trade serve as the primary functions of 
this new experiment (Yang 2016). Instead of delving deep into this finanscape which shares 
many similarities with the ones in previous case studies, I turn the focus to the technoscape at 
Erenhot under the context of OBOR, featured by a dilemma over the selection of a rail gauge. 
As the largest Chinese land port that opens directly to Mongolia, Erenhot processed more 
than 1000 train operations to Russia in 2018, with a year-on year growth of 80% (Li 2019). As so 
many trains run through Erenhot, however, one practical issue emerged: Mongolia, as the 
country in between the departure country---China, and the destination country---Russia, had to 
choose a suitable rail gauge at the China-Mongolia border because China and Russia use 
different standards of rail gauges. Specifically, as shown in Diagram 21, China now adopts the 
standard gauge that is mostly widely used across the world, which is the 1435 mm gauge. Russia, 
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on the other hand, has always been using its own gauge that is known as the “Russian Gauge”---
1520 mm. Since Mongolia followed Russia to use the Russian gauge domestically, the 
“difference in gauge” problem does not occur at the Russia-Mongolia border. But this problem 
did exist at Erenhot, the place where Chinese railways are connected to the Mongolian ones. As 
Mongolia attempted to reach a balance point between China and Russia, the debate over whether 
to adopt China’s standard gauge to increase the connectivity between China and Mongolia was 
heated, as evidenced by what the Mongolian president Khaltmaagiin Battulga, who was then the 
Minister of Transportation, claimed in the 2016 presidential election: “Tanks can easily penetrate 
into Mongolia in no time if we build a railway with a [narrower] gauge track, the same used in 
China” (Hillman 2019). Therefore, as this story reveals, I argue that a dilemma exists between 
enhancing cross-national connectivity and protecting national security, especially at land ports 
where disjunctures between countries and societies are easily observed. 
 
Diagram 21: Major Gauges of the Global Rail Systems 
(source: Rodrigue 2008) 
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In the end, Mongolia circumvented the dilemma by refusing to change to the standard 
gauge, and thus today’s trains passing through Erenhot to Mongolia have to wait until the 
railway gauge is transferred to the Russian gauge, a process that costs about an hour. 
 
Diagram 22: Changing Rail Gauge at Erenhot 
(source: Sohu 2018) 
 
Accordingly, a technological debate over rail gauge thus actively contributed to the 
shaping of the technoscape at Erenhot under OBOR, featured by contentions and controversies. 
Though the rail gauge change also happens at some other land ports, at Erenhot it particularly 
reflects the dilemma of a country in between two major powers over the infrastructure standard 
and its potential security implications. 
Impacts on the ethnoscape, mediascape, and ideoscape of Erenhot are collectively 
reflected in the efforts of building a model zone of “people-to-people bonds” in the locality. 
Within the zone, communities such as schools and hospitals from both Mongolia and China are 
paired with each other to establish a relationship. For instance, Erenhot International Institute 
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admitted 140 Mongolian students in 2016, and Erenhot Mongolian Middle School signed a treaty 
with The National University of Mongolia, which has promoted student exchanges of more than 
1100 people (North News 2017). Through academic exchange and communication, the 
ethnoscape became increasingly dynamic. Moreover, in the Erenhot Municipal Hospital, 
instructions in another two languages besides Chinese have been added: Uyghur-type 
Mongolian, shown for local Chinese residents who speak Mongolian, and Cyrillic-type 
Mongolian, shown for Mongolian residents who come across the border to Erenhot (Zhang et al. 
2018). Thus, the increasingly dynamic movement of people at Erenhot due to OBOR motivated a 
multicultural environment and diversified both the mediascape and ideoscape at Erenhot.  
The local-scale effort to facilitate OBOR at Erenhot is best exemplified in the reforms of 
customs clearance. Specifically, by improving the coordination mechanism with the 
corresponding land port on the Mongolian side, Erenhot has avoided the dependence on 
documents processing in physical copies, and all cargo manifest documents between China and 
Mongolia are electronic (People.cn 2017). 
In sum, from the four case studies I argue that OBOR imposed a significant impact on 
multiple landscapes of a land port at a local level, including economic influence reflected by 
various cooperation centers and zones, demographic influence featured by a greater population 
influx from inland provinces, technological influence based on infrastructure expertise, and 
cultural influence represented by a mix of various cultures. Additionally, since land port is a 
place that represents both global flows---goods and people are transported from one country to 
another, and national sovereignty---it lies on border, the representation of a nation state’s 
maximum geographical reach, we have observed economic and political disjuctures here with 
contentions and controversies, especially over technology. Meanwhile, improvements of land 
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ports in terms of both infrastructure construction and institutional coordination facilitated the 
progress of OBOR by enhancing the connectivity of people, goods, and capital, and increasing 
the efficiency of customs, although the extent of improvements varies with geography, and 
challenges still exist. 
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Conclusion 
 
      This thesis analyzed the impact of One Belt One Road Initiative at different geographical 
scales. At a global scale, in order to deepen the economic integration across the world, Beijing 
put forward OBOR as a tool to construct better infrastructures, improve multilateral trade, and 
strengthen cultural ties, all of which are potential impacts that have earned attention from other 
major economies. Debated over the nature and the real purposes of OBOR, competing narratives 
from China, the U.S., and the EU have created enough contentions. 
      Putting aside the rhetoric debate, to better understand the working mechanism of OBOR 
and its influence at other scales I delve into the main skeletons of this ambitious initiative---
economic corridors, by analyzing both their theories and realities. Six corridors that cover many 
countries and extend into different geographical regions are infrastructure-based passages that 
aim at promoting economic growth, institutional coordination, and cultural communication. 
Surveying a number of specific projects and activities along the corridors, I found the impact of 
OBOR at a national level to be both significant and contentious. Infrastructure projects, for 
example, indeed enhanced the physical connectivity between countries and contributed to 
solving energy issues. However, the “connectivity” in terms of cultures between China and other 
countries faces more challenges, as evidenced in either the distrust within international relations, 
or opposition to foreign influence. Moreover, I also tried to picture the scenario behind the 
construction of economic corridors by analyzing the role of the Chinese domestic politics, 
pointing out several important realities including the rise of competing voices within the Chinese 
government and a more active participation in OBOR from academics. 
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      Further, I investigated the impact of OBOR from a local perspective at land ports. Land 
ports, situated on national borders, are important nodes along economic corridors. Specifically, I 
select Alataw Pass, Khorgos, Manzhouli, and Erenhot, which are all westward-oriented land 
ports, as case studies. Through examining the finanscape, ethnoscape, technoscape, mediascape, 
and ideoscape at these four land ports, I found that OBOR contributed greatly and differently to 
the expansion of multiple landscapes of land ports through the establishment of border economic 
zones, more population flow, technology instilment in infrastructures, and increasingly mixed 
cultural environment. On the other hand, investment in infrastructure development and 
improvement in efficient custom policies are two major ways that local governments adopt to 
support OBOR. 
      As an ambitious initiative that covers more and more countries, OBOR is still in progress 
today, and additional considerations besides economics and culture have been involved. 
Therefore, continuous researches on its nature and adaptability are necessary. 
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